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Comment
Enforcing the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission Guidelines on Discrimination
Because of National Origin: The
Overextension of English-Only Rules in
Garcia v. Spun Steak Co.
Cara D. Helper
The English-speaking majority's attempts to standardize
the English language comprise a recurring theme throughout
American history.1 This insecurity in relation to minority lan-
guages, and the corresponding concern with ensuring the
supremacy of the English language,2 resurfaced following the
1. See Juan F. Perea, Demography and Distrust: An Essay on American
Languages, Cultural Pluralism, and Official English, 77 MN. L. REv. 269
(1992). Perea describes a historical "myth of linguistic homogeneity" that per-
petuates the official English movement and the perception that American lan-
guages other than English are "foreign." Id. at 272. According to Perea, the
legal definitions of American identity often involve elements of ethnicity, in-
cluding the recent attempts to define English as the official American language.
Id. at 328-71.
Senate Judiciary subcommittees held hearings in 1984 and 1986 on pro-
posed constitutional amendments to make English the official language of the
United States. Id. at 341. Thus far, official English proponents have failed to
secure either an official English federal statute or an amendment to the Consti-
tution making English the official language in America. Id. at 341-42. The pas-
sage of many state laws in the 1980s and the possibility of a federal statute,
however, arguably establish the necessity for a federal constitutional amend-
ment. Id. at 341-42 & n.407. But see id. at 356-71 (arguing that official English
laws create invidious classifications that violate the Equal Protection Clause).
2. See Michele Arington, English-Only Laws and Direct Legislation: The
Battle in the States Over Language Minority Rights, 7 J.L. & POL. 325, 326 n.11
(1991) (noting that several commentators argue that the English-only propo-
nents focus disproportionately on Hispanics and that the movement constitutes
a backlash against the wave of Hispanic immigrants); see also Kenneth L.
Karst, Paths to Belonging: The Constitution and Cultural Identity, 64 N.C. L.
REV. 303, 309 (1986) (noting that "distrust of the members of a different cul-
tural group flows from fear, not just of the unknown but the fear that outsiders
threaten our own acculturated views of the natural order of society"); Perea,
supra note 1, at 346-47 (asserting that the official English movement exempli-
fies the erroneous belief that "national unity depends on ethnic unity").
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most recent wave of immigration from Latin America and Asia.3
Reflecting this trend, employers have implemented rules that
require employees to speak English in the workplace.4 In re-
sponse, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
('EEOC")5 promulgated guidelines ("EEOC Guidelines"), 6 inter-
3. See Note, 'Official English": Federal Limits on Efforts to Curtail Bilin-
gual Services in the States, 100 HARv. L. REv. 1345, 1346 n.6 (1987) (noting
correlation between support for the English-only movement and states with
high concentrations of non-English speakers).
Since 1961, immigration from Mexico and Asia has increased, while immi-
gration from Europe has decreased. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF
COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 10 (108th ed. 1988).
A recent study predicts that the dramatic increase in the number of Hispanic
workers experienced during the 1980s will continue. Peter Cattan, The Grow-
ing Presence of Hispanics in the U.S. Work Force, MONTHLY LAB. REV., Aug.
1988, at 9. The report projects that Hispanics will represent 10% of the Ameri-
can workforce by the year 2000. Id. at 10.
4. Linda M. Mealey, Note, English-Only Rules and "Innocent" Employers:
Clarifying National Origin Discrimination and Disparate Impact Theory Under
Title VII, 74 MINN. L. REv. 387, 392 & n.22 (1989) (discussing the increase in
English-only workplace policies).
5. Title VII empowers the EEOC to prevent any person from engaging in
any unlawful employment practice. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(a) (1988). The Com-
mission must serve notice and investigate when a complainant files a charge.
§ 2000e-5(b). If the EEOC determines that there is reasonable cause to believe
that the charge is true, the agency must attempt to settle the charge informally.
Id. If the EEOC fails to secure an acceptable conciliation agreement, the EEOC
may bring a civil action against any respondent except a government or govern-
mental agency. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1).
6. EEOC Guidelines on Discrimination Because of National Origin "de-
fine[ ] national origin discrimination broadly as including, but not limited to,
the denial of equal employment opportunity because of an individual's, or his or
her ancestor's, place of origin; or because an individual has the physical, cul-
tural or linguistic characteristics of a national origin group." 29 C.F.R. § 1606.1
(1993). Specifically, the EEOC Guidelines address English-only rules:
(a) When applied at all times. A rule requiring employees to speak
only English at all times in the workplace is a burdensome term and
condition of employment. The primary language of an individual is
often an essential national origin characteristic. Prohibiting employ-
ees at all times, in the workplace, from speaking their primary lan-
guage or the language they speak most comfortably, disadvantages an
individual's employment opportunities on the basis of national origin.
It may also create an atmosphere of inferiority, isolation and intimida-
tion based on national origin which could result in a discriminatory
working environment. Therefore, the Commission will presume that
such a rule violates Title VII and will closely scrutinize it.
(b) When applied only at certain times. An employer may have a rule
requiring that employees speak only in English at certain times where
the employer can show that the rule is justified by business necessity.
29 C.F.R. § 1606.7 (footnote omitted). Title VII authorizes the EEOC to issue
procedural regulations. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-12(a) (1988).
The Supreme Court has ruled that, consistent with congressional intent,
courts should give "great deference" to EEOC guidelines. Griggs v. Duke Power
1994] ENGLISH-ONLY RULES 393
preting Title VII of the Civil Rights Act7 and declaring that Eng-
lish-only rules create a presumption of discriminatory impact
based on national origin.8 An employer may rebut this pre-
sumption by articulating nondiscriminatory business
justifications.9
In September 1990, the Spun Steak Company ("Spun
Steak") adopted a policy that forbade speech on the job in any
language other than English.' 0 After the company disciplined
Co., 401 U.S. 424, 433-34 (1971) (upholding EEOC Guidelines on Employment
Testing Procedures); see also EEOC v. Commercial Office Prods., 486 U.S. 107,
115 (1988) (stating that "EEOC's interpretation of ambiguous language need
only be reasonable to be entitled to deference"); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody,
422 U.S. 405, 430-31 (1975) (adopting EEOC Guidelines on Employment Selec-
tion Procedures).
7. Title VII provides:
(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise
to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensa-
tion, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such
individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for em-
ployment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any indi-
vidual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his
status as an employee, because of such individual's race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1988). Congress, however, provided a narrow exception:
An employer may discriminate on the basis of "religion, sex, or national origin
in those certain instances where religion, sex, or national origin is a bona fide
occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that
particular business or enterprise." § 2000e-2(e)(1).
Although Title VII does not explicitly define the term "national origin," dur-
ing House discussion Representative Roosevelt defined it as "the country from
which you or your forebears came from." 110 CONG. REC. 2549 (1964); see also
Mealey, supra note 4 (arguing that the definition of national origin should in-
clude linguistic characteristics).
Although Congress failed to define "national origin" discrimination, Con-
gress has provided a definition of sex discrimination. In 1978, Congress added
§ 701(k) to Title VII:
The terms "because of sex" or "on the basis of sex" include, but are not
limited to, because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or re-
lated medical conditions; and women affected by pregnancy, childbirth,
or related medical conditions shall be treated the same for all employ-
ment-related purposes ....
42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1988).
8. See supra note 6 (stating text of EEOC Guidelines); infra notes 30-53
and accompanying text (discussing the burden-shifting framework for disparate
impact analysis).
9. See infra notes 30-53 and accompanying text (discussing the burden
shifting framework for disparate impact analysis).
10. Garcia v. Spun Steak Co., 998 F.2d 1480, 1483 (9th Cir.), reh'g denied,
13 F.3d 296 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2726 (1994). In response to
the Supreme Court's request for input, the Clinton Administration submitted a
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two employees, Priscilla Garcia and Maricela Buitrago, for
speaking Spanish during working hours, the EEOC found rea-
sonable cause to believe the company violated Title VII.11 Con-
sequently, these employees and their union filed suit under Title
VII on behalf of themselves and all Spanish-speaking employees
at Spun Steak,12 contending that the company discriminated
with respect to their "terms, conditions, or privileges of employ-
ment."13 Although the Ninth Circuit had embraced the EEOC
Guidelines in a 1988 decision,' 4 the Spun Steak court rejected
the EEOC Guidelines under a "disparate impact" analysis.' 5
Thus, the Ninth Circuit became the first and only circuit to ad-
dress an intra-employee English-only rule and permit an em-
ployer to adopt a discriminatory policy without a business
justification.' 6
This Comment argues that the Ninth Circuit's failure to
characterize Spun Steak's English-only rule as a prima facie
case of disparate impact discrimination pursuant to the EEOC
Guidelines reflects inadequate consideration of Title VII's legis-
lative history and the considerable deference the Supreme Court
brief asserting that English-only rules discriminate based on national origin
and that they must be justified by business necessity. Nevertheless, the Court
denied the President's request to review Spun Steak. Employment: Adminis-
tration Urges Supreme Court to Rule on Legality of English-Only Rules, Daily
Report for Executives (BNA), June 6, 1994, available in Westlaw, BNA-DER
Database, 1994 DER 106 d32.
11. Id. at 1483-84. See generally supra notes 5-6 (discussing the EEOC's
role in employment discrimination disputes).
12. Spun Steak, 998 F.2d at 1484.
13. Id.; see also supra note 7 (stating text of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)). The
trial court concluded that Spun Steak's language policy violated Title VII be-
cause it "disparately impacted Hispanic workers without sufficient business
justification." 998 F.2d at 1484. The EEOC filed an amicus brief in response to
Spun Steak's appeal to the Ninth Circuit. Id.
14. Gutierrez v. Municipal Court, 838 F.2d 1031, 1040-41 (9th Cir. 1988),
vacated as moot, 490 U.S. 1016 (1989). The Gutierrez court applied the EEOC
Guidelines and held that an employer must demonstrate business necessity
before the employer may enforce a limited English-only rule. Id.; see also infra
notes 80-84 (discussing Gutierrez).
15. 998 F.2d at 1484-90; see also infra notes 30-53 and accompanying text
(describing the disparate impact theory of recovery under Title VII). Although
the court conceded that any adverse effects caused by the English-only policy
will be suffered by those of Hispanic origin, the court denied that the policy
caused any significant adverse impact. 998 F.2d at 1486-89.
16. See Garcia v. Spun Steak Co., 13 F.3d 296, 296 (9th Cir. 1993) (Rein-
hardt, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc). Judge Reinhardt ar-
gued that Spun Steak's "misguided removal of [EEOC] protection, based largely
on two judges' subjective judgment that the discriminatory impact of English-
only rules is 'not significant,' seriously undermines one of the basic goals of Title
VII." Id. at 299.
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attributes to federal agencies. Part I examines the history of Ti-
tle VII, as well as the elements and applications of the two theo-
ries of employment discrimination the Supreme Court has
delineated. Part II discusses the holding and reasoning in Gar-
cia v. Spun Steak Co., with particular focus on the Ninth Cir-
cuit's rejection of the EEOC Guidelines. Part III contends that
recognition of English-only policies as discriminatory practices
based on national origin advances Title VII's sweeping objective
of eliminating any and all forms of employment discrimination
on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. This
Comment concludes that the federal courts should clarify the
discriminatory status of English-only policies by requiring em-
ployers to provide business justifications for these policies. Such
a requirement would reinforce judicial deference to administra-
tive agencies and minimize national origin discrimination that
has accompanied increasing diversity in the American
workplace.
I. THE TREND TOWARD RECOGNIZING HOSTILE WORK
ENVIRONMENTS AS TITLE VII VIOLATIONS
A. THE ORIGIN OF TITLE VII OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF
1964
Historically, employers had the freedom to use whatever
hiring and employment policies they desired.' 7 In 1964, how-
ever, Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act ("Act") to equalize
employment opportunities and conditions. 18 Title VII of the Act
prohibits employment discrimination based on "race, color, reli-
gion, sex, or national origin."19 Since Title VII's enactment,
Supreme Court decisions repeatedly have held that the Act's
17. LAR A. RoTHSTEIN ET AL., EPLOYmNT LAw 212-14 (2d ed. 1992) (not-
ing underrepresentation of racial minorities and women in desirable areas of
the workplace due to historical absence of regulation in selection methods).
18. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 253 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992)). See gener-
ally RoTHsTEiN ET AL., supra note 17, at 214-22 (discussing the passage of the
Civil Rights Act).
19. See supra note 7 (stating text of 42 U.S.C. § 20OOe-2(a)); see also Griggs
v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429-30 (1971) ("The objective of Congress in
the enactment of Title VII is plain from the language of the statute. It was to
achieve equality of employment opportunities and remove barriers that have
operated in the past to favor an identifiable group of white employees over other
employees."). The Court has asserted that "Congress intended to prohibit all
practices in whatever form which create inequality in employment opportunity
due to discrimination on the basis of race, religion, sex, or national origin...
and ordained that its policy of outlawing such discrimination should have the
19941
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plain language permits and even requires the broadest possible
definition of "discrimination."20
B. THE Two THEORIES OF EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
In Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 21 the Supreme Court estab-
lished that Title VII prohibits two types of discriminatory treat-
ment by employers: practices that constitute intentional
disparate treatment,22 and practices that appear facially neu-
'highest priority.'" Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S 747, 763 (1976)
(quoting Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 47 (1944)).
20. Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 448 (1982) (noting that Title VII
"speaks, not in terms of jobs and promotions, but in terms of limitations and
classifications that would deprive any individual of employment opportunities"
(footnote omitted)); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 416 (1975)
(noting that Title VII is "a complex legislative design directed at a historic evil
of national proportions"). In Rogers v. EEOC, the court explained:
This language evinces a Congressional intention to define discrimina-
tion in the broadest possible terms. Congress chose neither to enumer-
ate specific discriminatory practices, nor to elucidate in extenso the
parameter of such nefarious activities. Rather, it pursued the path of
wisdom by being unconstrictive, knowing that constant change is the
order of our day and that the seemingly reasonable practices of the
present can easily become the injustices of the morrow.
454 F.2d 234, 238 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 957 (1972). Title VII
does not specifically define "discrimination." See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17
(1988 & Supp. IV 1992). The legislative history of Title VII, however, provides
assistance. A memorandum by Senators Clifford P. Case and Joseph S. Clark,
the bipartisan Senate floor managers for Title VII of the 1964 Act, asserted that
§ 2000e-2(a) in itself "defined the employment practices prohibited by the title."
110 CONG. REC. 7212-13 (1964). Senators Case and Clark explained:
[Discrimination] is clear and simple and has no hidden meanings. To
discriminate is to make a distinction, to make a difference in treatment
or favor, and those distinctions or differences in treatment or favor
which are prohibited by section 704 [enacted as § 2000e-2(a)] are those
which are based on any five of the forbidden criteria ....
Id. at 7213; see also Peter Brandon Bayer, Mutable Characteristics and the Defi-
nition of Discrimination Under Title VII, 20 U.C. DAvis L. REv. 769, 780-94
(1987) (arguing that Congress adopted an expansive definition of discrimina-
tion); Stephen M. Cutler, Note, A Trait-Based Approach to National Origin
Claims Under Title VII, 94 YALE L.J. 1164, 1165 (1985) (arguing that courts
should use a trait-based approach, instead of an approach based on immutable
characteristics, to fulfill the purposes of Title VII because discrimination begins
with the attachment of arbitrary or extraordinary significance to human differ-
ences). The House Report accompanying the 1972 amendments described "em-
ployment discrimination" as a "complex and pervasive phenomenon" and stated
that "[e]xperts familiar with the subject generally describe the problem in
terms of 'systems' and 'effects' rather than simply intentional wrongs." H. REP.
No. 238, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 8, reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2137, 2144.
21. 401 U.S. 424,436 (1971) (holding that employer's high school education
and testing requirements violated § 703(a)(2) of Title VII).
22. See infra notes 24-29 and accompanying text (explaining disparate
treatment discrimination).
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tral, but nonetheless produce discriminatory consequences
based on a classification that Title VII proscribes. 23
1. Disparate Treatment Theory
The Court applies disparate treatment theory to review em-
ployer decisions based on personal judgment or subjective crite-
ria.2 4 If the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of intentional
discrimination,25 the burden shifts to the employer to assert a
legitimate, nondiscriminatory business reason for such treat-
ment.26 Economic motives do not justify discriminatory conduct;
rather, the employer must demonstrate that the discriminatory
policy fits the narrow bona fide occupational qualification
("BFOQ") exception.27 If the employer establishes a BFOQ, the
23. 401 U.S. at 431. The Court explained that Congress requires the "re-
moval of artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers to employment when the
barriers operate invidiously to discriminate on the basis of racial or other im-
permissible classification." Id. at 431. "Congress directed the thrust of the Act
to the consequences of employment practices, not simply the motivation." Id. at
432. Consequently, the Court determined that a plaintiff need not always prove
intentional discrimination to establish an employer's violation of Title VII. Id.
at 436; see also notes 30-53 and accompanying text (describing disparate impact
theory).
24. In International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S.
324 (1977), the Court explained that disparate treatment is "the most easily
understood type of discrimination. The employer simply treats some people less
favorably than others because of their race, color, religion, sex, or national ori-
gin. Proof of discriminatory motive is critical, although it can in some situa-
tions be inferred from the mere fact of differences in treatment." Id. at 335 n.15.
25. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) (providing
criteria to establish a prima facie case of discrimination). The complainant
bears the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case by showing that: she
belongs to a class protected under Title VII; she applied for and was qualified
for the job for which the employer was seeking applicants; she was rejected
despite her qualifications; and, after rejecting her, the employer continued to
seek applications from persons with the complainant's qualifications for the po-
sition in question. Id. at 802. See also Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v.
Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981) (clarifying the burdens of proof and production for
plaintiffs and defendants). According to the Burdine Court, once established,
the prima facie case creates a presumption that the employer unlawfully dis-
criminated against the employee. Id. at 254-55; see also Diaz v. AT & T, 752
F.2d 1356, 1361 (9th Cir. 1985) (determining that the burden of establishing a
prima facie case of discrimination is not "onerous" and only requires the produc-
tion of evidence that "suggests" that the employment decision was based on an
illegal criterion).
26. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 803. The Court in International
Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 205 (1991), held that the
narrow BFOQ defense requires application of the "essence of the business" test.
Id. at 1205.
27. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1); Arizona Governing Comm. v. Norris, 463
U.S. 1073, 1107-09 (1983) (per curiam) (holding the valid stereotype that wo-
19941 397
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plaintiff may show that the employer's stated reason is pretex-
tual.28 Thus, the plaintiff retains the ultimate burden of persua-
sion for a claim of intentional discrimination. 29
2. Development of Disparate Impact Theory
Underlying disparate impact theory is the Court's recogni-
tion that some employment practices, adopted without a dis-
criminatory motive, nonetheless operate as functional
equivalents of intentional discrimination. 30 Under Title VII,
"practices, procedures, or tests neutral on their face, and even
neutral in terms of intent, cannot be maintained if they operate
to 'freeze' the status quo of prior discriminatory employment
practices."31 Accordingly, the elements of proof necessary under
disparate impact analysis differ from those under the disparate
treatment theory of recovery.32
The Supreme Court first directly addressed the criteria for
disparate impact claims in Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,33 in which
a class of African-American employees challenged its employer's
requirement that persons acquire a high school diploma or pass
a standardized intelligence test to qualify for advancement or
transfer.34 The Court found that neither criteria bore a signifi-
cant relationship to successful job performance and that both re-
men live longer than men insufficient to constitute a BFOQ that would permit
the employer to compel individual women to contribute more money to their
voluntary pension accounts than similarly situated men).
28. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 804.
29. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253.
30. Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 986-87 (1988) (hold-
ing that disparate impact analysis applies to a discretionary promotion system).
31. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430 (1971).
32. Watson, 487 U.S. at 986-87. 'The factual issues and the character of
the evidence are inevitably somewhat different when the plaintiff is exempted
from the need to prove intentional discrimination." Id. at 987.
33. 401 U.S. 424 (1971); see also James E. Jones, Jr., The Development of
the Law Under Title VII Since 1965: Implications of the New Law, 30 RUTGERS
L. REV. 1, 1 (1976) (describing how most cases that preceded Griggs involved
procedural or minor issues). After Griggs, the Court further developed the cri-
teria for analyzing disparate impact cases by articulating a three-part test in
Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975). The plaintiff bears the
initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination by presenting
evidence that a particular employment practice adversely affected members of a
protected class. Id. at 425 (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 801-
05). If the plaintiff succeeds in making a prima facie case, the burden shifts to
the employer to prove that the practice was job related and served a necessary
business function. Id. If the employer meets this burden, the case shifts back
to the employee to show that nondiscriminatory practices would serve the em-
ployer's legitimate business interest. Id.
34. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 427-28.
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quirements perpetuated a long-standing practice of excluding a
greater proportion of African-American applicants than white
applicants.3 5 Thus, the Griggs Court explained that the "touch-
stone [of disparate impact analysis] is business necessity."3 6
Following Griggs, courts have recognized disparate impact aris-
ing out of other selection devices, including minimum height and
weight requirements, 37 nepotism, 38 and accent. 39
Disparate impact evidence usually includes competing ex-
planations of statistical disparities, rather than specific inci-
dents of discriminatory actions.40 Statistics showing ethnic
imbalance between the composition of an employer's workforce
and the composition of the relevant labor market are probative
"because such imbalance is often a telltale sign of purposeful dis-
35. Id. at 431. Section 703(h) of Title VII provides that an employer may
use "any professionally developed ability test provided that such test ... is not
designed, intended, or used to discriminate because of race, color, religion, sex,
or national origin." 42 U.S.C. § 200e-2(h) (1988). The Griggs Court deferred to
the EEOC's interpretation of this section in holding that the company's tests
did not meet the requirement that they be job-related. 401 U.S. at 436.
36. 401 U.S. at 431. The business necessity defense applied in disparate
impact cases represents a more lenient standard for the employer than the
BFOQ defense. International Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S.
187, 198 (1991).
37. See, e.g., Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 328-32 (1977) (holding
that statutory height and weight standards adversely impacted female
applicants).
38. See, e.g., Banilla v. Oakland Scavenger Co., 697 F.2d 1297, 1304 (9th
Cir. 1982) (holding that an employer's shareholder plan restricting ownership
to family members, all of whom were of Italian ancestry, violated 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-2(a)), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1251 (1984).
39. See, e.g., Carino v. University of Oklahoma Bd. of Regents, 750 F.2d
815, 819 (10th Cir. 1984) (finding discrimination where an employer demoted
the plaintiff from position as dental lab supervisor because of his foreign ac-
cent); Berke v. Ohio Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 628 F.2d 980 (6th Cir. 1980) (finding
national origin discrimination against an employee demoted due to his Filipino
accent). But cf. Fragante v. City of Honolulu, 888 F.2d 591 (9th Cir. 1989). The
Fragante court concluded that the City based its rejection of an applicant with a
Filipino accent on the BFOQ of effective communication rather than national
origin discrimination. Id. at 599.
40. Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 987 (1988). For
instance, the EEOC generally regards selection of less than 80% of a protected
group as evidence of adverse impact. Uniform Guidelines on Employer Selec-
tion Procedures, 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4(D) (1993).
The Court has acknowledged that the utility of statistics to establish a
prima facie case of disparate impact depends on "all of the surrounding facts
and circumstances." International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S.
324, 339-40 (1977). Statistics are much more likely to be determinative in dis-
parate impact cases, where the object is to prove discriminatory effect. In dis-
parate treatment cases, comparative evidence is more helpful. See supra notes
24-29 and accompanying text (discussing elements of disparate treatment).
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crimination."41 More recently, the Court held that courts may
apply disparate impact analysis to subjective or discretionary,
as well as objective, employment practices. 42
In the late 1980s, however, a series of Supreme Court deci-
sions began to narrow the scope of Title VII.43 Specifically, in
Wards Cove v. Atonio,4 the Court shifted the burden regarding
business necessity to the employee by requiring plaintiffs to
specify which challenged employment practice caused the al-
leged disparity.45 The Court also lowered the standard to estab-
lish a business necessity defense.46 Consequently, a number of
legislators resolved to correct this jurisprudence, particularly
the Wards Cove decision, that had "weakened the scope and ef-
fectiveness of Federal civil rights protection 47 regarding em-
ployment discrimination.48
3. Disparate Impact Following the Civil Rights Act of 1991
The Civil Rights Act of 1991 ("1991 Act")49 reversed parts of
seven Supreme Court decisions that were adverse to alleged vic-
41. Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 340 n.20.
42. Watson, 487 U.S. at 989-91. The Watson Court applied disparate im-
pact analysis to a banls informal promotion criteria based on the subjective
judgment of supervisors. Id.
43. See infra notes 44-50 and accompanying text (discussing Congress's re-
sponse to Supreme Court decisions that weakened federal civil rights
protection).
44. 490 U.S. 642, 650-55 (1989) (holding that statistical evidence showing a
high percentage of nonwhite workers in an employer's cannery jobs and a low
percentage of such workers in noncannery positions failed to establish a case of
disparate impact).
45. Id. at 656-57.
46. Id. at 659.
47. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 2(2), 105 Stat. 1071
(1991) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1981 note (Supp IV. 1992)).
48. See generally Robert A. Robertson, The Civil Rights Act of 1991: Con-
gress Provides Guidelines for Title VII Disparate Impact Cases, 3 GEO. MASON
U. Civ. RTs. L.J. 1, 15-57 (1992) (discussing the legislative history of the 1991
Act). Introducing the civil rights bill, Senator Kennedy noted that the Supreme
Court recently made a "series of rulings that mark an abrupt and unfortunate
departure from its historic vigilance in protecting civil rights." 136 CONG. REC.
S1018 (daily ed. Feb. 7, 1990) (statement of Sen. Kennedy). The summary ac-
companying the bill stated that the statute would restore the Griggs rule. Id. at
S1021.
49. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified
in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). The 1991 Act provides in part:
Sec. 2. Findings.
The Congress finds that-
(1) additional remedies under Federal law are needed to deter un-
lawful harassment and intentional discrimination in the workplace;
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tiros of employment discrimination. 50 The 1991 Act added a
new section to Title VII constituting Congress' first statutory
guideline for disparate impact cases.5 1 Section 703(k) declares
unlawful any employment practice resulting in disparate impact
unless the employer can "demonstrate that the challenged prac-
tice is job related for the position in question and consistent with
business necessity."52 Thus, the 1991 Act shifted the burden of
(2) the decision of the Supreme Court in Wards Cove Packing Co.
v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989) has weakened the scope and effective-
ness of Federal civil rights protections; and
(3) legislation is necessary to provide additional protections
against unlawful discrimination in employment.
Sec. 3. Purposes.
The purposes of this Act are-
(1) to provide appropriate remedies for intentional discrimination
and unlawful harassment in the workplace;
(2) to codify the concepts of "business necessity" and "job related"
enunciated by the Supreme Court in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401
U.S. 424 (1971), and in the other Supreme Court decisions prior to
Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atenio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989);
(3) to confirm statutory authority and provide statutory guidelines
for the adjudication of disparate impact suits under title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.); and
(4) to respond to recent decisions of the Supreme Court by ex-
panding the scope of relevant civil rights statutes in order to provide
adequate protection to victims of discrimination.
42 U.S.C. § 1981 note (Supp. IV 1992). The 1991 Act passed after a two-year
struggle in Congress. See Robertson, supra note 48, at 15-57.
50. Civil Rights Act of 1991, § 3(4), 42 U.S.C. § 1981 note (Supp. IV 1992);
see also Robertson, supra note 48, at 10-15 (discussing the enactment of the
1991 Civil Rights Act in response to a series of Supreme Court decisions that
narrowed Title VII protection).
The 1991 Act implicitly overrules six Court decisions in addition to Wards
Cove. Civil Rights Act of 1991-Analysis, 9 BNA Employee Rel. Wkly. No. 44,
at S-1 (Nov. 11, 1991). The Bureau of National Affairs summarized the 1991
Act as "a pointed message to the conservative-dominated court that its overall
judicial attitude on the subject of civil rights is not what Congress has in mind."
Id.; see also 136 CONG. REC. S1024 (daily ed. Feb. 7, 1990) (statement of Sen.
Packwood) (stating that the Supreme Court "needs a clear signal from Congress
that employment discrimination is unacceptable in all forms and under all cir-
cumstances, and that Congress expects the Court to reflect that in its
decisions").
51. See Note, The Civil Rights Act of 1991: The Business Necessity Stan-
dard, 106 HARv. L. REV. 896, 912-13 (1993). Congress's decision to codify dispa-
rate impact as a separate cause of action, and its decision to shift the burden of
proof to the defendant in the second stage of litigation, indicate dissatisfaction
with the Court's attempt to merge disparate impact and disparate treatment
doctrines in Wards Cove. Id. The 1991 Act suggests that the Court should in-
terpret the "business necessity" standard more broadly than it might have done
in the absence of Congressional approval. Id.
52. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (Supp. IV 1992). This section overruled
the Wards Cove holding that the plaintiff has the burden of proving the absence
of business necessity after establishing a prima facie case of disparate impact.
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production regarding business justification back to the employer
and effectively returned disparate impact analysis to the pre-
Wards Cove standard.53
C. EEOC GUIDELINES AND RECOGNITION OF DISCRIMINATORY
CONDITIONS OF EMPLOYMENT
1. Deference Owed to EEOC Guidelines
Section 706 of Title VII authorizes the EEOC to administer
the statute.54 Accordingly, the EEOC has issued official,
although nonbinding, guidelines by which courts may evaluate
employers' compliance with the Act.55
Although the EEOC guidelines are nonbinding, the
Supreme Court stated in Chevron U.S.A, Inc. v. Natural Re-
sources Defense Council, Inc.,56 and later in Rust v. Sullivan,57
that courts owe agency interpretations great deference. 58 Spe-
cifically, courts must accord an EEOC guideline "great defer-
ence" in the absence of "compelling indications that it is wrong"
or "inconsistent with an obvious congressional intent not to
reach the employment practice in question."5 9 For example, the
Court in Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson60 embraced the
EEOC's definition of "hostile environment" sexual
discrimination.
61
See Wards Cove v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 658-60 (1989). The complainant may
also establish disparate impact by showing the availability of a less discrimina-
tory alternative practice that the employer has refused to adopt. 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(ii).
53. After the 1991 Act, to establish a prima facie case of disparate impact,
plaintiffs must show that a specific policy of the employer has an adverse im-
pact on a protected group under Title VII. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(B)(i) (Supp.
IV 1992).
54. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5, 2000e-12 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992); see also supra
note 5 (discussing EEOC authority under Title VII).
55. See supra note 6 (discussing judicial deference to EEOC guidelines).
56. 467 U.S. 837, 842-44 (1984) (holding that if a statute is "silent or am-
biguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether
the agency's answer represents a permissible construction of the statute").
57. 500 U.S. 173, 184 (1991) (holding that the construction of Title X by the
Secretary of Health and Human Services "may not be disturbed as an abuse of
discretion if it reflects a plausible construction of the plain language of the stat-
ute and does not otherwise conflict with Congress' expressed intent").
58. Id. (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43).
59. Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 86, 94-95 (1973).
60. 477 U.S. 57, 64-67 (1986) (holding that sexual harassment that creates
a hostile or abusive condition of employment constitutes sex discrimination
under Title VII).
61. Id. The EEOC Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex set out two
types of sexual harassment claims: quid pro quo and hostile environment har-
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2. EEOC Guidelines Addressing English-Only Rules
Following an increase in the number of employees who
speak a primary language other than English, several employ-
ers have instituted English-only workplace rules.62 Because
challenges to English-only policies have focused on disparities in
the "terms, conditions, or privileges of employment" under sec-
tion 703(a)(1) of Title V1,63 rather than on barriers to hiring or
promotion, such claims differ from most disparate impact cases
decided thus far.6 4 The timing of the promulgation of relevant
EEOC guidelines65 and the passage of the 1991 Act 6 6 further
complicate this issue. Although the Supreme Court has ac-
knowledged that language can function as a surrogate for race
and national origin for purposes of equal protection analysis, 67
assment. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (1985). The guidelines prohibit harassment
that "has the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an individual's
work performance or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working en-
vironment." Id. § 1604.11(a)(3). The hostile environment standard requires
both an objectively hostile or abusive environment and the victim's subjective
perception of harassment. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 367, 370
(1993). The court must consider all of the circumstances in each case and no
single factor is determinative. Id. at 370-371. The Court has not associated
abusive environment discrimination with either disparate treatment or dispa-
rate impact theory. Furthermore, the employer's defense to such claims in-
volves the employer's response to the harassment, rather than a business
necessity or BFOQ standard.
62. See Mealey, supra note 4, at 392 & n.22 (discussing the increase in
English-only workplace rules).
63. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).
64. See Garcia v. Spun Steak Co., 998 F.2d 1480, 1485 (9th Cir.) (noting
case law analyzing disparate impact only under § 2000e-2(a)(1)), reh'g denied,
13 F.3d 296 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2726 (1994).
65. See infra text accompanying notes 73-74 (discussing the promulgation
of Guidelines on Discrimination Because of National Origin).
66. See supra notes 47-53 and accompanying text (discussing the remedial
purpose of the 1991 Act).
67. Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352 (1991). Holding that persons of
Mexican descent constitute a distinct class for purposes of equal protection
analysis, the plurality stated: "It may well be, for certain ethnic groups and in
some communities, that proficiency in a particular language, like skin color,
should be treated as a surrogate for race under an equal protection analysis."
Id. at 371. Hernandez indicated that strong links exist between language and
ethnicity. Id. The Court avoided the language discrimination issue, however,
by finding that the prosecutor struck prospective Spanish-speaking jurors be-
cause of their demeanor as well as their bilingualism. Id. at 369. See also An-
drew P. Averbach, Note, Language Classifications and the Equal Protection
Clause: When is Language a Pretext for Race or Ethnicity?, 74 B.U. L. REv. 481
(1994) (discussing language classifications under equal protection analysis).
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the Court has yet to address expressly the issue of English-only
employment policies under Title VII.68
The first court to confront an English-only rule held that re-
quiring employees to sacrifice such individual self-expression vi-
olated Title VII. 69 In contrast, in Garcia v. Gloor,70 the Fifth
Circuit reached the opposite conclusion.71 The Gloor court, how-
ever, explicitly limited itself in holding "only that an employer's
rule forbidding a bilingual employee to speak anything but Eng-
lish in public areas while on the job is not discrimination based
on national origin" if an employee's noncompliance with the rule
fails to relate to the employee's personal preference and not to
the employee's ability to comply.72
In response to Gloor, the EEOC promulgated Guidelines on
Discrimination Because of National Origin,73 which distinguish
Gloor and provide that proof of the existence of an English-only
policy establishes a prima facie case of disparate impact.74 Sub-
sequently, the Ninth Circuit cited with approval the EEOC
Guidelines in Jurado v. Eleven-Fifty Corp.,75 in which the em-
ployer radio station dismissed a bilingual radio announcer for
disobeying a rule that forbade speaking Spanish on the air.76
Nevertheless, the court rejected plaintiff's theories of disparate
impact and disparate treatment 77 because the language rule
68. Spun Steak, 998 F.2d at 1485.
69. Saucedo v. Brothers Well Serv., Inc., 464 F. Supp. 919, 922 (S.D. Tex.
1979) (holding that discharging an employee for violating an English-only rule
disparately impacted Mexican-American employees and that no business neces-
sity existed).
70. 618 F.2d 264 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1113 (1981).
71. Id. at 266. The court distinguished national origin from ethnic or soci-
ocultural characteristics. Id. at 269 (rejecting a discrimination challenge to a
rule prohibiting sales employees from speaking Spanish on the job, unless used
in communicating with Spanish-speaking customers).
72. Id. at 272. The court also declared that "[o]ur opinion does not impress
a judicial imprimatur on all employment rules that require an employee to use
or forbid him from using a language spoken by him at home or by his forebears."
Id. The court found that the plaintiff's noncompliance with the English-only
rule was a matter of personal preference. Id. at 270.
73. 45 Fed. Reg. 85,632, 85,634-35 (1980) (codified at 29 C.F.R. § 1606.7
(1991)). The EEOC specifically noted that no guideline existed when the Fifth
Circuit decided Gloor. Id. See also supra note 6 (stating text of EEOC
Guidelines).
74. See supra note 6 (stating text of EEOC Guidelines).
75. 813 F.2d 1406, 1411 (9th Cir. 1987).
76. Id. at 1408-09. The station fired Jurado for refusing to comply with the
station's decision to change his broadcasting format to English only. Id.
77. In rejecting Jurado's disparate impact claim, the court denied that the
English-only rule disproportionately disadvantaged Hispanics. Id. at 1412.
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constituted a BFOQ for one particular position7 8 and the parties
did not genuinely dispute that the employer based the program-
nuing decision on business concerns. 79
The following year, in Gutierrez v. Municipal Court,80 the
Ninth Circuit rejected the Gloor analysis and followed the
EEOC Guidelines, overturning a municipal court judges' man-
date that court employees speak English during working
hours."' The court characterized the language discrimination as
a burdensome employment condition based on national origin.8 2
The Supreme Court vacated that decision as moot, however,
without indicating how to analyze English-only workplace
rules.8 3 Thus, until Garcia v. Spun Steak Co., Gutierrez was the
only case to apply the EEOC Guidelines to a general workplace
language policy.8 4
II. GARCIA v. SPUN STEAK CO.
In Garcia v. Spun Steak Co.,8 5 the Spun Steak Company in-
stituted a policy prohibiting speech other than English on the
78. Id. at 1411 (describing the policy as a "limited, reasonable and busi-
ness-related English-only rule").
79. Id. at 1410. The court found insufficient evidence that racial bias moti-
vated the English-only policy because a previous bilingual format had failed to
improve the radio station's ratings and the employer articulated marketing,
ratings, and demographic concerns for the rule. Id. The court also declined to
compare Jurado to another radio announcer because the two programs involved
different formats and audiences. Id.
80. 838 F.2d 1031, 1038-40 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding that an English-only
rule for court employees had a disparate impact based on national origin and no
business justification existed), vacated as moot, 490 U.S. 1016 (1989).
81. Id. at 1039.
82. Id. The court applied the EEOC's business necessity standard and re-jected the municipal court's five proposed justifications for the rule. Id. at 1041-
44. For example, the court held that the municipal court's assertion that the
English-only rule promoted racial harmony was "unsupported by the evidence."
Id. at 1042. Furthermore, the court held that existing ethnic/racial fears cannot
justify a discriminatory classification. Id. at 1043. The court also rejected the
contention that an official English amendment to the California Constitution
constituted business necessity. Id. at 1044.
83. Gutierrez, 490 U.S. at 1016. The validity of a court's analysis remains
unaffected when a case is vacated as moot. See 13A CHARMus A. WRIGHT ET AL.,
FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE: JURISDICTION 2D § 3533.10 (1984).
84. Compare Gutierrez, 838 F.2d at 1040 (discussing application of EEOC
Guidelines to intra-employee workplace policy), with Garcia v. Spun Steak Co.,
998 F.2d 1480, 1483 (9th Cir.) (stating Spun Steak's English-only workplace
policy), reh'g denied, 13 F.3d 296 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2726
(1994).
85. 998 F.2d 1480 (9th Cir.), reh'g denied, 13 F.3d 296 (9th Cir. 1993), cert.
denied, 114 S. Ct. 2726 (1994).
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job.8 6 The Spanish-speaking employees brought suit, contend-
ing that the employer's policy disparately impacted them8 7 in
violation of Title VII's prohibition against discrimination in
"terms, conditions, and privileges of employment," a section
703(a)(1) claim.s8 In characterizing the issue as whether the
policy caused significant adverse effects, the court conceded that
the English-only policy disparately impacted the Hispanic work-
ers.89 Nevertheless, the court held the policy's adverse impact
86. Id. at 1483. After receiving complaints that some employees harassed
and insulted other workers in a language they could not understand, the com-
pany's president instituted the following English-only policy:
[I]t is hereafter the policy of this Company that only English will be
spoken in connection with work. During lunch, breaks, and employees'
own time, they are obviously free to speak Spanish if they wish. How-
ever, we urge all of you not to use your fluency in Spanish in a fashion
which may lead other employees to suffer humiliation.
Id. Spun Steak adopted an additional rule prohibiting any "offensive racial,
sexual or personal remarks." Id. The employer concluded that such a policy
would promote racial harmony at work, improve work quality, and increase
worker safety. Id.
87. Id. at 1484; see also supra notes 30-53 and accompanying text (describ-
ing disparate impact discrimination). Twenty-four of Spun Steak's 33 employ-
ees spoke Spanish. 998 F.2d at 1483. Almost all of the Spanish-speaking
employees were Hispanic. Id. Although two employees did not speak English,
the remaining Spanish-speakers had varying degrees of English fluency. Id.
The company never required a specific degree of proficiency in English as a con-
dition of employment. Id.
After Spun Steak sent warning letters to Garcia and Buitrago for speaking
Spanish, and prohibited them from working next to each other, the two employ-
ees and their union, Local 115, filed discrimination charges with the EEOC. Id.
The EEOC investigated and determined that there was reasonable cause to be-
lieve Spun Steak violated Title VII by adopting the English-only rule and by
retaliating when Garcia, Buitrago, and Local 115 complained. Id. at 1483-84.
Garcia, Buitrago, and Local 115 proceeded to file suit against Spun Steak on
behalf of all of the Spanish-speaking employees. Id. at 1484.
88. 998 F.2d at 1485. The Spanish-speaking employees did not attempt to
prove that Spun Steak intentionally discriminated against them as required to
establish a disparate treatment case. Id. Although previous disparate impact
cases focused on barriers to hiring and promotion under § 703(a)(2), 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-2(a)(2), the Spun Steak employees alleged a violation of § 703(a)(1), 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). Id.; see also supra note 7 (stating text of 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-2(a)). Spun Steak represents the Ninth Circuit's first attempt to apply
disparate impact analysis to claims under § 703(a)(1). 998 F.2d at 1485.
89. 998 F.2d at 1486. The court conceded:
[I]f the English-only policy causes any adverse effects, those effects will
be suffered disproportionately by those of Hispanic origin.... It is of no
consequence that not all Hispanic employees of Spun Steak speak
Spanish; nor is it relevant that some non-Hispanic workers may speak
Spanish. If the adverse effects are proved, it is enough under Title VII
that Hispanics are disproportionately impacted.
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insufficient to violate Title VII.90
As a threshold matter, the Ninth Circuit held that employ-
ees who spoke both Spanish and English failed to establish a
prima facie case of disparate impact for an English-only policy.91
The Spun Steak majority discussed and rejected the three argu-
ments the Spanish-speaking employees used to demonstrate the
policy's adverse effect.9 2 The court first rejected the employees'
contention that the English-only policy denied them the right to
cultural expression.93 The majority asserted that Title VII ad-
dresses disparities in the treatment of workers, but does not
confer substantive privileges such as self-expression.9 4 The em-
ployees also argued that the English-only policy caused a dispa-
rate impact because it prevented them from conversing in their
preferred language on the job, a privilege that Spun Steak ex-
tended to native-English speakers. 95 Focusing upon the employ-
ees' ability to comply with the policy, the court concluded that
the employer may define the privilege of conversing on the job
narrowly because bilingual employees can comply with the rule
and still enjoy the privilege. 96
90. Id. at 1485. The court rejected the proposition that a "burdensome
term or condition of employment or the denial of a privilege would limit, segre-
gate, or classify' employees in a way that would 'deprive any individual of em-
ployment opportunities' or 'otherwise adversely affect his status as an
employee' in violation of section 703(a)(2)." Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
2(a)(2)). Furthermore, the court denied the rule had an adverse impact under
§ 703(a)(1). See infra notes 91-97 (describing the court's analysis of the employ-
ees' disparate impact claim).
91. Spun Steak, 998 F.2d at 1489-91. The majority held that a court must
consider all of the circumstances of the particular factual context to determine
whether English-only rules "are enforced in such a draconian manner that the
enforcement itself amounts to harassment." Id. at 1489. The court remanded
the issue of whether the language policy disparately impacted employees with a
limited English proficiency. Id. at 1490. The court determined that there was a
genuine issue of material fact as to whether the policy adversely affected non-
English speakers. Id.
92. Id. at 1486-90.
93. Id. at 1487.
94. Id. (citing Garcia v. Gloor, 618 F.2d 264, 269 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. de-
nied, 449 U.S. 1113 (1981)).
95. Spun Steak, 998 F.2d at 1487.
96. Id. at 1487-88 (citing Jurado v. Eleven-Fifty Corp., 813 F.2d 1406, 1412
(9th Cir. 1987)). The court noted that "privileges of employment" are, by defini-
tion, granted at the employers discretion; therefore, the employer may define
the limits of privileges. Id. at 1487. The majority quoted a Fifth Circuit deci-
sion for the proposition that "[t]here is no disparate impact with respect to a
privilege of employment 'if the rule is one that the affected employee can readily
observe and nonobservance is a matter of individual preference.'" Id. (quoting
Gloor, 618 F.2d at 270).
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The court also rejected the employees' argument that the
policy created an atmosphere of inferiority and isolation under
the hostile working environment theory applied in sexual har-
assment cases.97 The majority acknowledged that in rejecting
the employees' attempt to establish a prima facie case of dispa-
rate impact based on the existence of an English-only policy, "we
reach a conclusion opposite to the EEOC's long standing posi-
tion."98 Nevertheless, the court asserted that nothing in the lan-
guage99 nor legislative history of Title VIIs section 703(a)(1)
sustained the EEOC's English-only Guidelines.100 Rather than
identify specific evidence that the EEOC Guidelines represent
an impermissible construction of the statute,10 ' the majority
broadly asserted that the Guidelines contravene congressional
intent.'0 2 The Spun Steak court objected to the EEOC Guide-
lines' presumption of disparate impact, stating that the plaintiff
must prove the alleged discriminatory effect before the burden
shifts to the employer to establish a business necessity.' 03 In so
deciding, the court claimed to follow Fifth and Ninth Circuit pre-
cedent.' 0 4 In contrast, Judge Boochever's dissenting opinion ad-
vocated embracing the EEOC Guidelines, both because of the
deference traditionally accorded to the EEOC and because of the
employer's ability to specify business justifications with relative
ease.' 0 5
97. Id. at 1488. The court explicitly refused to "adopt a per se rule that
English-only policies always infect the working environment to such a degree as
to amount to a hostile or abusive work environment." Id. at 1489.
98. Id. at 1489.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 1489-90. The court stated that there is no discussion of English-
only policies in the legislative history to Title VII, and no other discussion indi-
cating that courts must presume English-only policies discriminatory. Id.
101. See supra notes 56-59 and accompanying text (discussing judicial defer-
ence to agency construction of statutory provisions).
102. Spun Steak, 998 F.2d at 1489-90. The court asserted that Congress
intended to strike a balance between the prevention of discrimination and the
preservation of the employer's independence. Id.
103. Id. at 1490.
104. Id. at 1487. See infra part 11I.C (arguing that the court misapplied
precedent).
105. Id. at 1490-91 (Boochever, J., dissenting). Judge Boochever recognized
that the EEOC deserves great deference:
It is hard to envision how the burden of proving [an atmosphere of in-
feriority, isolation and intimidation based on national origin] would be
met other than by conclusory self-serving statements .... The diffi-
culty of meeting such a burden may well have been one of the reasons
for the promulgation of the guideline. On the other hand, it should not
be difficult for an employer to give specific reasons for the policy ....
The lack of directly supporting language in § 703(a)(1) or the legisla-
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III. AGENCY DEFERENCE AND RECOGNITION OF
ENGLISH-ONLY WORKPLACE RULES AS
NATIONAL ORIGIN DISCRIMINATION
PROHIBITED BY TITLE VII
The EEOC Guidelines' presumption of national origin dis-
crimination reflects the agency's conclusion that, in general,
rules prohibiting the use of foreign languages adversely impact
protected groups. 10 6 The Spun Steak majority disregarded the
EEOC Guidelines and applied a narrow interpretation of na-
tional origin discrimination, but failed to provide persuasive rea-
sons for ignoring the traditional deference courts attribute to
EEOC guidelines.'0 7 The court's refusal to embrace the EEOC's
interpretation of Title VII is erroneous because the court failed
to articulate congressional intent that rendered the agency's in-
terpretation of the statute impermissible. Furthermore, the
court ignored the Supreme Court's determination that the
"EEOC's interpretation of ambiguous language need only be rea-
sonable to be entitled to deference." 0 8 Finally, the Spun Steak
majority erred by misconstruing prior caselaw.
A. THE ADMINISTRATIVE INTERPRETATION OF TITLE VII IS
ENTITLED TO GREAT DEFERENCE IN THE ABSENCE OF
CONTRARY CONGRESSIONAL INTENT
In invalidating the EEOC Guidelines, the Spun Steak ma-
jority abandoned the Chevron-Rust rule that prohibits courts
from disturbing an agency construction of a statute if the
agency's interpretation reflects a plausible construction of the
plain language of the statute and does not otherwise conflict
with Congress's expressed intent.10 9 Although the Spun Steak
court acknowledged that only "compelling indications that it is
tive history of Title VII, relied on by the majority, does not in my opin-
ion make the guideline "inconsistent with an obvious congressional
intent not to reach the employment practice in question."
Id.
106. Gutierrez v. Municipal Court, 838 F.2d 1031, 1040 (9th Cir. 1988), va-
cated as moot, 490 U.S. 1016 (1989); see also supra note 6 (stating text of EEOC
Guidelines).
107. See supra notes 6, 56-61 and accompanying text (citing cases declaring
that an EEOC guideline is entitled to great deference in the absence of compel-
ling indications that the guideline is wrong).
108. EEOC v. Commercial Office Prods. Co., 486 U.S. 107, 115 (1988) (per
curiam) (citation omitted).
109. Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 184 (1991); see also supra notes 56-59
and accompanying text (discussing judicial deference to agency
interpretations).
1994]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 79:391
wrong" justify the rejection of an EEOC guideline, 110 the court
made only a superficial effort to meet this standard.
In its brief discussion of the "compelling" reasons for
invalidating the EEOC Guidelines, the majority asserted
that the Guidelines contravene congressional reluctance to
infringe on the independence of employers except regarding
discriminatory practices. 111 In addition to ignoring the
burden-shifting framework for disparate impact analysis,
112
the court's conclusion fails to consider the EEOC Guidelines'
focus on discriminatory practices." 3  Moreover, the Spun
Steak court offered only the broad congressional policy of
balancing employees' rights against those of the employer,
11 4
rather than "an obvious congressional intent not to
reach the employment practice in question." 1 5 Because "[i]t
is well established that legislative history which does not
demonstrate a clear and certain congressional intent cannot
form the basis for enjoining [agency] regulations,"116 the court
110. Garcia v. Spun Steak Co., 998 F.2d 1480, 1489 (9th Cir.) (quoting Espi-
noza v. Farah Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 86, 94-95 (1973)), reh'g denied, 13 F.3d 296
(9th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2726 (1994).
111. 998 F.2d at 1489-90. The court noted that Congress could not have
enacted Title VII without the support of legislators who traditionally resisted
the federal regulation of business. Id.
112. See supra notes 30-53 and accompanying text (discussing the frame-
work of disparate impact analysis).
113. The Guidelines represent a codification of the agency's findings regard-
ing discriminatory language policies. Gutierrez v. Municipal Court, 838 F.2d
1031, 1040 (9th Cir. 1988), vacated as moot, 490 U.S. 1016 (1989); see also supra
note 6 (stating text of EEOC Guidelines).
114. Spun Steak, 998 F.2d at 1490. The court maintained that presuming
an English-only policy disparately impacts employees contravenes the congres-
sional policy of striking a balance between preventing discrimination and pre-
serving the employer's independence. Id. Moreover, the court objected to the
EEOC Guidelines based on the irrelevant and undisputed proposition "that a
plaintiff in a disparate impact case must prove the alleged discriminatory effect
before the burden shifts to the employer." See id.
115. Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 86, 94 (1973).
116. Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 189-90 (1991). In Rust, the Court ex-
plained that the statements the petitioners relied upon were "highly genera-
lized" and did not "directly address the scope" of the relevant provision. Id. at
188-89. Just as the relevant statute in Rust omitted specific directions regard-
ing the Secretary's implementation of the statute, Title VII excludes any limit
on the definition of national origin discrimination or the EEOC's responsibility
for implementing the statute. Id.; see supra notes 6-7 (discussing EEOC's au-
thority under Title VII and stating text of 42 U.S.C § 2000e-2(a)). Judge
Boochever's dissent in Spun Steak criticized the majority's reliance on the ab-
sence of directly supporting language in Title VII or its legislative history.
Spun Steak, 998 F.2d at 1491 (Boochever, J., dissenting) (quotingEspinoza, 414
U.S. at 94).
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erred in asserting that the EEOC Guidelines conflict with con-
gressional intent.117
B. THE EEOC GUIDELINES ENCOMPASS A REASONABLE
CONSTRUCTION OF TITLE VII
The Spun Steak court failed to recognize that "the EEOC's
interpretation... need only be reasonable to be entitled to defer-
ence."" 8 In refusing to apply the EEOC's interpretation of Title
VII, the court ignored the legislative history of Title VII. Fur-
thermore, the court's holding that English-only rules do not ad-
versely impact certain employees overlooks the need to apply a
strict business necessity standard to prevent hostile working en-
vironments. Finally, the court failed to appreciate the intimate
relationship between language and national origin.
1. The EEOC Guidelines Reflect the Legislative History of
Title VII and Corresponding Caselaw
Although the Spun Steak court asserted that nothing in the
legislative history of Title VII supports a presumption of dis-
criminatory impact for English-only rules, 1 9 the language and
history of the Act require the opposite conclusion. 120 Congress
intentionally defined discrimination in the least limiting terms
without proscribing specific practices to meet the growing com-
plexity of employment issues.12 Indeed, the EEOC promul-
117. In Espinoza, for example, the Court invalidated an EEOC guideline
providing that Title VII prohibits an employer from discriminating based on
citizenship against a lawful alien resident and held that a lawful alien could not
become a federal employee. 414 U.S. at 90. The Court pointed to statutes that
demonstrated congressional intent contrary to the EEOC guideline. Id. at 90-
91. The Spun Steak majority, by contrast, revealed no evidence that following
the enactment of Title VII, Congress intended to exclude English-only rules
from the definition of national origin discrimination. See 998 F.2d at 1480-90.
Indeed, Congress has refused to adopt a federal English-only rule. See supra
note 1 (discussing failed attempts to make English the official language of the
United States).
118. EEOC v. Commercial Office Prods. Co., 486 U.S. 107, 115 (1988) (per
curiam); see also supra notes 56-59 and accompanying text (discussing judicial
deference to agency interpretations).
119. Spun Steak, 998 F.2d at 1490.
120. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429 (1971) ("The objective
of Congress in the enactment of Title VII is plain from the language of the stat-
ute. It was to achieve equality of employment opportunities and remove barri-
ers that have operated in the past to favor an identifiable group of white
employees over other employees."); see generally supra notes 19-20, 47-53 and
accompanying text (discussing the legislative history of Title VII).
121. See supra notes 18-20, 23 and accompanying text (discussing congres-
sional intent in enacting Title VII); cf Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 184 (1991)
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gated the Guidelines pursuant to Title Virs specific mandate
that the EEOC effectuate the Act.122 Furthermore, the major-
ity's analysis in Spun Steak conflicts with the Ninth Circuit's
own concession that courts must interpret broadly Title ViI's
provisions. 123
The Supreme Court has recognized that Congress, through
the 1964 Act' 24 and subsequent Title VII amendments, 125
targeted the entire spectrum of discriminatory employment con-
ditions.1 26 Despite Congress's failure to specify how a court
should determine whether a facially neutral selection standard
is discriminatory,1 27 the pro-plaintiff 1991 amendments128 indi-
cate that "discrimination is unacceptable in all forms and under
all circumstances, and ... Congress expects the Court to reflect
that in its decisions."129 Accordingly, Congress intended to de-
fine "national origin" broadly.130
The Ninth Circuit also erroneously cited the absence of leg-
islative history specifically addressing Title VII's applicability to
English-only policies as support for its decision. 13 ' According to
the Supreme Court, "[i]f a statute is 'silent or ambiguous with
respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether
the agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of the
statute.'"132 The majority's logic suggests that Congress must
consider every possible violation of every statute it enacts.
(holding that the broad language of the relevant statute and Congress's broad
directives permitted the agency's construction where Congress left broad terms
undefined).
122. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-12(a) (1988).
123. Spun Steak, 998 F.2d at 1485.
124. See supra notes 19-20,23 and accompanying text (discussing Title VII's
broad purpose).
125. See supra note 7 (discussing the broad definition of sex discrimination
under 1978 amendments); supra notes 47-53 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing the remedial purpose of the 1991 Act).
126. Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64 (1986). See 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1988 & Supp. 1992) for text of Title VII.
127. See supra notes 49-53 and accompanying text (describing the remedial
purposes of the 1991 Act).
128. See supra notes 49-53 and accompanying text (describing the remedial
purposes of the 1991 Act); see also supra note 19-20, 23 (discussing the broad
scope of Title VII).
129. 136 CONG. REC. S104 (daily ed. Feb. 7, 1990) (statement of Sen.
Packwood).
130. See supra notes 18-20, 23 and accompanying text (discussing Title VII's
broad purpose).
131. Garcia v. Spun Steak Co., 13 F.3d 296 (9th Cir. 1993) (Reinhardt, J.,
dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc).
132. Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 184 (1991) (quoting Chevron U.SA,
Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984));
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Rather than list every conceivable discriminatory act, Congress
drafted Title VII expansively and authorized the EEOC to re-
spond to employment discrimination as new issues surface. 133
Thus, the majority's analysis reveals an erroneously narrow
view of EEOC authority and "challenge[s] the EEOC's ability to
enact rules codifying its findings regarding specific discrimina-
tory practices." 13 4
2. The Importance of the Business Necessity Defense to
Prevent Hostile Working Environments
The EEOC's determination that English-only rules estab-
lish a prima facie case of national origin discrimination consti-
tutes a reasonable interpretation of Title VII considering that
the "touchstone [of disparate impact analysis] is business neces-
sity."13 5 Indeed, in enacting the 1991 Civil Rights Act, Congress
redirected the courts to eliminate employment discrimination 36
by codifying the Griggs standard and returning the burden of
proof for business necessity to the employer. 137 The Spun Steak
court, however, failed to appreciate the basic issue in cases in-
volving English-only rules: whether the employer's use of a
specified language as a condition of employment is legitimate.
a. The Similarity Between Sexual Harassment Discrimination
and Language Discrimination
Recognition of the adverse impact of English-only rules par-
allels the Supreme Court's recognition that sexual harassment
see also supra notes 56-59 and accompanying text (describing judicial deference
to agency interpretations).
133. See supra notes 19-20 (describing the legislative history of Title VII);
notes 54-59 and accompanying text (describing the role of a federal agency
under Chevron and EEOC power under § 706).
134. Garcia v. Spun Steak Co., 13 F.3d 296, 296 (9th Cir. 1993) (Reinhardt,
J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc).
135. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971). The Court noted:
'The Act proscribes not only overt discrimination but also practices that are fair
in form, but discriminatory in operation. The touchstone is business necessity.
If an employment practice which operates to exclude [a protected group] cannot
be shown to be related to job performance, the practice is prohibited." Id. In-
deed, "Congress has made [job] qualifications the controlling factor so that race,
religion, nationality, and sex become irrelevant." Id. at 436; see also Averbach,
supra note 67, at 483 (noting utility of the business necessity standard to distin-
guish between classifications that "use language to promote business efficiency,
and those that impermissibly use language to differentiate along ethnic lines.").
136. See supra notes 49-53 and accompanying text (discussing the 1991 Act).
137. See supra notes 47-53 and accompanying text (discussing the 1991
Aces remedial purpose).
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constitutes a per se discriminatory condition of employment. 138
Although Title VII does not expressly address sexual harass-
ment,13 9 the Supreme Court adopted an EEOC guideline ad-
dressing sexual discrimination and recognized that Title VII
protects the right to work in an environment free from harass-
ment based on gender."40 Accordingly, courts must examine the
totality of the circumstances in a particular workplace to deter-
mine whether workplace constitutes a "hostile" or "abusive" en-
vironment based on sexual status.141
The language policy in Spun Steak involves a more blatant
form of discrimination than sexual harassment because the rule
explicitly prohibits use of the Spanish language while work-
ing,' 42 and burdens only members of minority language
groups.14 3 Because business necessity constitutes the "touch-
stone" of disparate impact analysis, 44 and because courts must
assess all of the circumstances in a particular workplace to de-
termine whether that workplace constitutes a hostile environ-
138. See supra notes 60-61 and accompanying text (discussing hostile envi-
ronment discrimination in Supreme Court cases). The Supreme Court has not
explicitly recognized hostile environment discrimination under either disparate
treatment or disparate impact analyses. Nevertheless, the Court's recognition
that "a work environment abusive to employees because of their race, gender,
religion, or national origin offends Title VII's broad rule of workplace equality"
favors the EEOC Guidelines' presumption of discriminatory impact based on
the likelihood that English-only policies create hostile environments. Harris v.
Forklift Sys., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 367, 370 (1993); see also supra note 6 (stating text
of EEOC Guidelines).
139. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
140. See supra notes 60-61 and accompanying text (discussing hostile envi-
ronment discrimination).
141. Harris, 114 S. Ct. at 371. Title VII permits the plaintiff to use all evi-
dence to demonstrate a pattern or practice of discrimination, regardless of
whether the practice relates directly to the acquisition or loss of an employment
benefit. Id. Indeed, the Court emphasized that several factors are relevant to
the determination of whether the employee found the environment abusive and
that no single factor, particularly psychological harm, is required. Id. The cen-
tral issue is whether sex-related conduct was "unwelcome," not whether it was
"voluntary." Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 68 (1985). Similarly,
the central issue in a national origin discrimination involving an English-only
policy should be whether the English-only policy adversely impacts an em-
ployee, not whether the employee possesses the ability to speak English.
142. The rule involves disparate treatment on its face by targeting minority
language groups. See supra note 86 (stating text of Spun Steak's English-only
policy). Consequently, employers may monitor these groups much more closely
than employees belonging to the English-speaking majority.
143. See infra part III.B.3.b (discussing the language policy's exclusive im-
pact on protected groups).
144. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971).
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ment,145 courts should shift the burden to the employer to assert
business reasons in support of an English-only policy. 146
b. The Effect of the Framework of Disparate Impact on the
EEOC Guidelines
The Spun Steak majority asserted that the EEOC Guide-
lines amount to "a per se rule that English-only policies always
infect the working environment [to the same degree]."147 The
court's objection to the Guidelines' presumption of disparate im-
pact, based on the undisputed and irrelevant proposition that
plaintiffs have the burden of proving the discriminatory impact
of challenged policies, ignores the burden-shifting framework of
Title VII analysis. 148 If and when the employee demonstrates a
prima facie case of discrimination, the burden shifts to the em-
ployer to provide nondiscriminatory reasons for the policy or
practice. 149 A presumption of discrimination for English-only
rules does not imply that such a policy will have the same effect
in every case.150 Rather, a rebuttable presumption recognizes
the relative ease with which an employer may point to specific
non-discriminatory reasons for the policy. 151 In the absence of
the EEOC presumption, an employee bears the difficult task of
proving discriminatory impact through self-serving, subjective
statements. 1
52
145. Harris, 114 S. Ct. at 371.
146. Because the court in Spun Steak dismissed the prima facie case of dis-
parate impact, it did not proceed to the second step of disparate impact analy-
sis. Garcia v. Spun Steak Co., 998 F.2d 1480, 1486-87 (9th Cir.), reh'g denied,
13 F.3d 296 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2726 (1994). If the court had
shifted the burden to the employer, the 1991 Act would require the employer to
justify its English-only policy. See supra notes 49-53 and accompanying text
(describing the remedial purpose of the 1991 Act).
147. Spun Steak, 998 F.2d at 1489.
148. See supra notes 30-53 and accompanying text (describing the frame-
work of disparate impact analysis). The court's criticism makes sense in the
context of a conclusive presumption, but not in the context of the rebuttable
presumption applied in disparate impact analysis.
149. See supra notes 30-53 and accompanying text (describing the burden
shifting framework of disparate impact analysis).
150. See supra notes 36-53 (discussing the business necessity defense).
151. See Spun Steak, 998 F.2d at 1490 (Boochever, J., dissenting) (noting an
employee's difficulty establishing discrimination in the absence of the EEOC
Guidelines).
152. It appears that the real basis for the majority's rejection of the EEOC
presumption involved substantive disagreement with the Guidelines. A court's
preferences, however, are irrelevant in evaluating the validity of agency inter-
pretations. See supra part MI.A (discussing Chevron and the deference courts
habitually accord administrative interpretations).
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3. The Inextricable Ties Between Language and National
Origin
In rejecting the EEOC presumption of disparate impact for
English-only rules, the Spun Steak majority focused on the as-
sertion that English-only rules do not adversely affect certain
employees sufficiently to violate Title VII.15 3 The court's exclu-
sion of the English-only rule from the definition of national ori-
gin discrimination erroneously minimizes the interests of
language minorities, deeming those interests too insubstantial
for recognition under Title VII.'" As one commentator ob-
served, "[1]anguage is the lifeblood of every ethnic group. To eco-
nomically and psychologically penalize a person for practicing
his native tongue is to strike at the core of ethnicity."155
a. The Inherence of Language in the Definition of National
Origin
In denying the adverse impact of English-only rules, 15 6 the
Spun Steak court mischaracterized language as a mutable char-
153. Spun Steak, 998 F.2d at 1487-88. But see Cutler, supra note 20, at
1166-67 (arguing that a definition of national origin discrimination that in-
cludes the concept of discrimination on the basis of national origin-linked traits
recognizes that employers may draw distinctions among individuals of the same
ancestral origin as well as individuals of different ancestral origins).
154. But see supra note 67 (explaining that constitutional protection extends
to those who speak languages other than English). Just as proficiency in a par-
ticular language may serve as a proxy for race under equal protection analysis,
language may serve as a proxy for national origin. Title VII should protect the
rights of language minorities to a greater extent than the Equal Protection
Clause because most English-only laws would survive equal protection chal-
lenges in the absence of showing discriminatory intent. Arington, supra note 2,
at 334 (arguing that because language may serve as a proxy for national origin,
the EEOC Guidelines represent a reasonable interpretation of Title VII).
155. James Harvey Domenedux, Comment, Native-Born Acadians and the
Equality Ideal, 46 LA. L. REV. 1151, 1167 (1986).
156. Spun Steak, 998 F.2d at 1486-89. The Court, in Espinoza v. Farah
Manufacturing Co., similarly declined to follow an EEOC guideline where there
was "no indication in the record that Farah's policy against employment of
aliens had the purpose or effect of discriminating against persons of Mexican
national origin." 414 U.S. 86, 92 (1973). In Espinoza, however, the worker hired
in place of Espinoza possessed a Spanish surname, and there was no suggestion
that the company refused to hire aliens of Spanish-speaking background while
hiring those of other national origins. Id. at 92-93 & n.5. In contrast, Spun
Steak instituted a condition of employment that disproportionately impacted
the Hispanic employees. Spun Steak, 998 F.2d at 1486. Moreover, the Espi-
noza Court articulated an obvious congressional intent not to reach the employ-
ment practice in question. 414 U.S. at 92. The Spun Steak court, however,
failed to meet that standard. See supra part III.A (discussing deference to
agency interpretations).
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acteristic involving a mere matter of personal preference. 157 To
the contrary, the ease with which an individual may alter his or
her conduct does not directly correlate with the importance an
individual attaches to that conduct. 158 For instance, both lan-
guage and religion shape an individual's identity and percep-
tions of the world.1 59 Individuals use language or follow religion
as a matter of preference, and they may alter either trait.
Although religion is arguably a mutable characteristic, Title VII
expressly prohibits discrimination based on religion. 60 Thus,
the mutability of a characteristic is not the proper inquiry.
Characterizing the ability to speak in one's chosen language
as a privilege given at the employer's discretion' 6' minimizes
the importance people attach to language.162 Language involves
both a means of communication and a societal symbol valued as
a fundamental aspect of national origin. 163 Governmental es-
tablishment of language policies entails extensive psychological
157. Spun Steak, 998 F.2d at 1487-89. But see Bayer, supra note 20, at 839
(arguing that mutability doctrine erroneously presumes "that the interests of
the discriminatees are too unimportant and too insubstantial for cognizance by
a federal court applying a federal statute"); Cutler, supra note 20, at 1166 (ar-
guing that if courts permit employers to favor employees who are more similar
to themselves, or more assimilated, Title VII becomes a statute that, at best,
coerces job applicants to assimilate and, at worst, prevents unassimilated appli-
cants from securing employment). Indeed, the legislative history of Title VII
indicates that Congress intended broad construction of the protected classifica-
tions, including mutable characteristics. See supra part III.B.1 (explaining the
compatibility between Title VIi's legislative history and the EEOC Guidelines).
158. See Bayer, supra note 20, at 839 (arguing that the alterability of behav-
ior or custom "provides few clues regarding the personal importance attached").
Indeed, the Spun Steak court failed to show that discrimination based on a mu-
table characteristic, such as choice of language, interferes less than immutable
characteristic discrimination with respect to terms and conditions of
employment.
159. See id. (arguing that individual dignity and personal freedom are often
inseparable from immutable characteristics and that courts should not dismiss
employees' claims that an employer's racially or ethnically premised rules un-
justly restrict personal integrity and expression).
160. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a).
161. See Spun Steak, 998 F.2d at 1487 (describing intra-employee conversa-
tions as a privilege).
162. The close relationship between an individual's primary language and
the culture derived from his national origin is not eliminated merely because
the individual is bilingual. Karst, supra note 2, at 354-57.
163. See Perea, supra note 1, at 350-57. Perea argues that an understand-
ing of the symbolic meaning of language requires an examination of the legal
treatment of ethnicity and different American languages. Id. Because the Eng-
lish language symbolizes the dominant culture's ethnicity, laws standardizing
the English language enforce the dominance of the America's core culture and
marginalize other American cultures, particularly Hispanic culture. Id. at 369.
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and cultural implications.'6 For instance, an individual's ac-
cent establishes the speaker as a member of a national origin
group, preventing individuals from being similarly situated. 165
Individuals often target groups with a primary language other
than English for discrimination based on language. 166 Thus,
courts have recognized that adverse employment decisions on
the basis of an employee's accent may violate Title VII.16 7
Stating that language is a characteristic that an individual
may, by definition, easily change wrongly presumes that an indi-
vidual forced to make a change or forego an employment oppor-
tunity endures little or no harm.168 Indeed, the Supreme Court
refuted the idea that the existence of discrimination depends on
the ability to choose between subordinating one's language pref-
erence and looking for employment elsewhere. 169 Title VII pro-
164. See id.
165. See Karst, supra note 2, at 352. Karst explains that "distinctive lan-
guage sets a cultural group off from others, with one consistent unhappy conse-
quence throughout American History: discrimination against members of the
cultural minority." Id. For example, Americans respond less favorably to a
speaker with a Spanish accent than one with a British accent. Id.
166. Id. at 354-57.
167. See supra note 39 and accompanying text (discussing discrimination
based on accent). For example, in Fragante v. City of Honolulu, 888 F.2d 591,
595 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1081 (1990), the Ninth Circuit recog-
nized the close ties between accent and national origin:
Accent and national origin are obviously inextricably intertwined in
many cases. It would therefore be an easy refuge in this context for an
employer unlawfully discriminating against someone based on na-
tional origin to state falsely that it was not the person's national origin
that caused the employment or promotion problem but the candidate's
inability to measure up to the communications skills demanded by the
job.
Id. at 596.
168. See Karst, supra note 2, at 351-57 (arguing that an individual's native
language remains an important part of her ethnic identity and a means of af-
firming ties to her original culture once she assimilates into American society);
see also Garcia v. Spun Steak Co., 13 F.3d 296, 298 (9th Cir. 1993) (Reinhardt,
J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc). Judge Reinhardt remarked
that the majority's analysis shows insensitivity to the facts and history of dis-
crimination. Id. Because some of the most objectionable discriminatory rules
are the least obtrusive in terms of one's ability to comply, courts should not
measure the adversity of consequences by the employees' ability to comply with
the rule. Id. For instance, although one may readily comply with a rule requir-
ing certain individuals to sit in the back of a bus, such a rule is clearly discrimi-
natory. Id.
169. See Arizona Governing Comm. v. Norris, 463 U.S. 1073, 1081-82 (1983)
(per curiam). The Court held a pension annuity program discriminatory on the
basis of gender where it secured female retirees less in monthly payments than
similarly situated male retirees. Id. The Court rejected the employer's alleged
justification that the employees were not required to join the retirement plan,
418
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hibits an employer from forcing an employee to choose between
discriminatory and nondiscriminatory terms and conditions of
employment.170
Moreover, Congress intended to define discrimination in the
broadest possible terms and to encompass all discrimination
based on race, color, religion, sex, and national origin. 17' Ex-
cluding a type of discrimination based on national origin from
Title Virs scope because the discrimination targets mutable as-
pects of that classification frustrates Title VII's purpose.17 2
Consequently, courts should adopt the EEOC Guidelines recog-
nizing that speech in one's native tongue involves the expression
of one's ethnicity and affects an individual's perceptions of her
environment. 173
b. The Exclusive Impact of English-Only Rules on Members of
National Origin Groups
The Ninth Circuit characterized Spun Steak's language pol-
icy as nondiscriminatory even though the policy effectively made
blatant distinctions on the basis of national origin.' 74 Charac-
teristics directly related to a classification protected by Title VII,
however, deserve the same treatment as the protected group.' 7 5
emphasizing that individual females may predecease similarly situated males
and receive less benefits despite equal contribution. Id. at 1076-77; see also
Bayer, supra note 20, at 790 (arguing that Norris stands for the proposition
that Title VII prohibits discriminatory employment practices based upon stere-
otypical assumptions regarding race, gender, national origin, or religion, unless
justified by statutory defenses).
170. Norris, 463 U.S. at 1081 n.10 (holding that Title VII forbids all discrim-
ination concerning conditions or privileges of employment "not just discrimina-
tion concerning those aspects of the employment relationship as to which the
employee has no choice"); see also-Bayer, supra note 20, at 791 (arguing that the
availability of nondiscriminatory alternatives neither mitigates the illegality of
offering options based on a proscribed classification, nor alters the fact that this
introduces an impermissible criterion).
171. See supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text (discussing the sweeping
purpose and scope of Title VII).
172. See supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text (discussing Title VII's
purpose).
173. See Perea, supra note 1, at 350-56 (arguing that language is a social
symbol that may be manipulated to achieve social or political goals).
174. Garcia v. Spun Steak Co., 998 F.2d 1480, 1490 (9th Cir.), reh'g denied,
13 F.3d 296 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2726 (1994).
175. See Cutler, supra note 20, at 1173. Courts should apply a trait-based
approach to root out employment practices that discriminate against the least
assimilated members of a national origin group solely because of the extent
they possess stereotypical traits. Id. Under a trait-based analysis, the court
would sustain a disparate impact claim based on a single criterion, even where
it negligibly impacted the relevant national origin group, if the employee dem-
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For instance, the Supreme Court recently emphasized that "dis-
crimination based on a woman's pregnancy is, on its face, dis-
crimination because of her sex," and a classification based on
pregnancy "must be regarded, for Title VII purposes, in the
same light as explicit sex discrimination.1 76 Under Title VII
disparate treatment analysis, an employer may discriminate on
the basis of sex, which includes pregnancy, only where the em-
ployer demonstrates the very narrow BFOQ defense. 177 Accord-
ingly, for the purposes of Title VII, "on the basis of sex" includes
discrimination "because of or on the basis of pregnancy, child-
birth, or related medical conditions." 178
Similarly, discrimination on the basis of national origin
should include discrimination on the basis of language and ac-
cent. Just as discrimination on the basis of pregnancy has an
exclusive adverse effect on women,'179 discrimination in the use
of primary languages other than English burdens only members
of protected groups with a primary language other than Eng-
lish.' 0 Thus, the explicit acceptance of discrimination based on
onstrates an adverse impact upon the least assimilated individuals of the rele-
vant group. Id. at 1172 n.36.
176. International Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 198-
99 (1991).
177. Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. at 200; see also supra note 27 (describing
BFOQ defense).
178. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a); Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. at 199 & n.3.
179. See Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. at 199.
180. English-only rules have a disparate impact on particular national ori-
gins because they impose an adverse employment condition on a significantly
higher percentage of employees belonging to a certain national origin group in
comparison to non-protected employees. Employees who speak only English
will never suffer the adverse effects of an English-only rule. Employers will
never discipline or discharge them for violating the rule. Indeed, the Spun
Steak court acknowledged that if the policy caused any adverse effects, the His-
panic workers disproportionately bear those effects. Garcia v. Spun Steak Co.,
998 F.2d 1480, 1486 (9th Cir.), reh'g denied, 13 F.3d 296 (9th Cir. 1993), cert.
denied, 114 S. Ct. 2726 (1994). The courts held it a violation of the Age Discrim-
ination in Employment Act to choose between two individuals within the pro-
tected group on the basis of their age. See Cutler, supra note 20, at 1167 &
n.16. Similarly, employers with English-only policies discriminate based on na-
tional origin even where some members of the protected group bear no adverse
impact. Cutler argues:
[Ilmprecision in measurability cannot justify neglect of the real differ-
ences among individuals and the real discrimination suffered by the
least assimilated of those individuals. To treat the national origin
group as a uniform, singular entity is to deny the force of Title VII's
antidiscrimination protection to those who need it most.
Id. at 1167-68.
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pregnancy as a violation of the Civil Rights Act suggests the rea-
sonableness of the EEOC Guideline on English-only policies.'
8
'
C. THE SPuW STEAKC COURT MISAPPLIED PRECEDENT
The Spun Steak court misapplied Gloor'8 2 and Jurado,
83
leading authorities regarding English-only rules.'-8 Not only
did no EEOC guideline exist for the Fifth Circuit to consider
when deciding Gloor,'8 5 but the EEOC actually promulgated its
Guidelines in response to Gloor.' 86 Indeed, the Gloor court ex-
plicitly limited its holding 8 7 and suggested that the court would
have deferred to a federal regulation stating a standard by
which to evaluate language restrictions.'88 Moreover, the court
in Jurado cited with approval the precise guideline that Spun
Steak rejected 8 9 and held it did not apply to the particular case
simply because English speech constituted a BFOQ for the job in
question. 190 Because Spun Steak differs significantly from Gloor
and Jurado, the Ninth Circuit erred in adopting the narrow
holdings of these two cases.
181. Arguably, the pregnancy analogy supports closer scrutiny of English-
only policies under disparate treatment analysis and provides even greater sup-
port for the EEOC's direction to analyze such rules under the more lenient dis-
parate impact analysis. The exclusive impact of English-only policies on
language minority groups parallels disparate treatment analysis, which re-
quires the employer to meet the tougher BFOQ standard for business justifica-
tions. See supra notes 26-28, 36 and accompanying text (distinguishing the
BFOQ and business necessity defenses).
182. Garcia v. Gloor, 618 F.2d 264 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
1113 (1981).
183. Jurado v. Eleven-Fifty Corp., 813 F.2d 1406 (9th Cir. 1987).
184. Garcia v. Spun Steak Co., 998 F.2d 1480, 1487-88 (9th Cir.), reh'g de-
nied, 13 F.3d 296 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2726 (1994).
185. See supra notes 70-72 and accompanying text (describing Gloor and
noting the absence of an EEOC regulation for the Gloor court to apply).
186. See supra notes 73-74 and accompanying text (describing the EEOC's
response to Gloor).
187. See supra note 72 and accompanying text (stating Gloor's holding).
188. See Gloor, 618 F.2d at 268 & n.1. The Fifth Circuit reasoned that the
EEOC had "adopted neither a regulation stating a standard for testing such
language rules nor any general policy, presumed to be derived from the statute,
prohibiting them. We therefore approach the problem on the basis of the stat-
ute itself and the case law." Id. at 268 n.1.
189. Jurado v. Eleven-Fifty Corp., 813 F.2d 1406, 1411 (9th Cir. 1987).
190. Id. In Jurado, the radio station's limited English-only rule passed the
BFOQ standard because it "was a programming decision motivated by market-
ing, ratings, and demographic concerns." Id. at 1410. By contrast, the Spun
Steak Company neither required its employees to speak or understand English
as a condition of employment, nor contended that it constituted a BFOQ. Gar-
cia v. Spun Steak Co., 998 F.2d 1480, 1483 (9th Cir.), reh'g denied, 13 F.3d 296
(9th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2726 (1994).
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Furthermore, the Gutierrez court applied the EEOC Guide-
lines to an intra-employee workplace rule that mirrored Spun
Steak's policy.191 Both employer policies concerned intra-em-
ployee conversations rather than the sale or distribution of the
employee's product.192 In holding the EEOC's business neces-
sity test the proper standard to determine the validity of Eng-
lish-only rules,193 the Gutierrez court noted the considerable
deference warranted by the EEOC guidelines,' 94 Title VII's
broad remedial purpose,195 and the close ties between certain
minority groups and language. 196 Significantly, the court also
distinguished both Gloor'97 and Jurado.198 Although the Gu-
tierrez decision does not bind the Ninth Circuit, 99 precedent fa-
vors application of the EEOC interpretation.
CONCLUSION
In the past few decades, American society has undergone
dramatic changes in its recognition of civil rights, particularly in
the employment context. Following the enactment of the 1964
191. The municipal court's rule provided that "[tihe English language shall
be spoken by all court employees during regular working hours while attending
to assigned work duties, unless an employee is translating for the non-English
speaking public. The rule does not apply to employees while on their lunch
hour or work breaks." Gutierrez v. Municipal Court, 838 F.2d 1031, 1037 (9th
Cir. 1988).
192. Compare Gutierrez, 838 F.2d at 1041 (discussing the intra-employee
policy instituted by the municipal court), with Spun Steak, 998 F.2d at 1483
(stating Spun Steak's English-only policy). Because of the sweeping nature of
the English-only policy and the direct adverse effect on the workplace environ-
ment, the Gutierrez court held that "ease of compliance has little or no rele-
vance; certainly, it is not a factor that could preclude a finding of disparate
impact." 838 F.2d at 1041.
193. Gutierrez, 838 F.2d at 1041.
194. Id. at 1039 n.7.
195. Id. at 1040 n.12.
196. Id. at 1039.
197. Id. at 1041.
198. Id. at 1041 n.13.
199. See Spun Steak, 998 F.2d at 1487 n.1. The court noted that because the
Supreme Court vacated Gutierrez as moot, the Spun Steak court need not follow
its reasoning. Id. Nevertheless, the court neither criticized the Gutierrez rea-
soning directly, nor offered an explanation for the Ninth Circuit's drastic devia-
tion from previous deference to EEOC interpretations. Id. Indeed, Judge
Reinhardt's dissent from denial of rehearing en banc noted that Gutierrez quit
her job before the appeal reached the Supreme Court. 13 F.3d 300, 301 (9th
Cir. 1993). Because Gutierrez might have remained binding precedent within
the Ninth Circuit but for the employee's job decision, the decision represented
the court's official opinion and, as such, deserved more than a dismissive foot-
note in Spun Steak. Id.
ENGLISH-ONLY RULES
Civil Rights Act, courts aggressively acknowledged Congress's
objective of eradicating discriminatory employment practices.
After this reformatory trend began to backslide in the late
1980s, Congress, in 1991, redirected the courts to reduce the em-
ployee's burden in proving a case of discrimination.
In Garcia v. Spun Steak Co., the Ninth Circuit failed to un-
derstand and incorporate into its decision congressional intent.
Instead, the majority weakly asserted that the EEOC Guide-
lines construing English-only rules as national origin discrimi-
nation conflict with Title VII. This Comment proposes that the
federal courts correct the Ninth Circuit's interpretation of Eng-
lish-only policies under Title VII. Employment decisions, condi-
tions, or qualifications premised on or implicating race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin, including English-only rules, are
discriminatory. To acknowledge the facially discriminatory as-
pect of such policies, courts must adhere to the EEOC Guide-
lines treating language rules as a prima facie case of disparate
impact. Such recognition is not only reasonable, but also neces-
sary to further the purpose of Title VII and to prevent employers
from discriminating based on the expression of ethnic traits.
1994]

